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Abstract: Paretian egalitarianism holds that equality should be promoted, but only when this 
does not conflict with certain (Pareto) efficiency considerations. Like leximin, it has the 
attractive feature of never favoring leveling down. It also offers the promise of avoiding 
leximin’s monomaniacal focus on the worst off affected person. We here show that, given certain 
widely accepted assumptions, certain forms of Paretian egalitarianism are incoherent and those 
that are coherent share leximin’s monomaniacal focus on the worst off affected person. It thus 
appears that Paretian egalitarianism is not a significant alternative to leximin. We end by 
questioning one of the assumed conditions: contraction consistency (Alpha). If this condition is 
rejected, Paretian Egalitarianism remains a significant alternative to leximin. 
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1. Introduction 
We here address the question of how, for a theory of justice, a concern for the promotion of 
equality can be combined with a concern for making people as well off as possible. Leximin, 
which requires making the worst off position as well off as possible, is one way of combining a 
concern for making people’s lives go well with a special concern for those who are especially 
poorly off. Many egalitarians, however, reject its near-monomaniacal focus on the worst off 
position (to the exclusion of other poorly off persons). In this paper, we explore the possibility of 
combining a weak kind of egalitarianism with a weak kind of efficiency requirement in a way 
that avoids leximin’s obsession with the worst off position. Surprisingly, given certain generally 
accepted assumptions, this turns out to be impossible. The only possible way of combining weak 
egalitarianism with weak efficiency requires, we shall show, the rejection of a widely accepted—
but perhaps dubious—contraction consistency condition on justice. 
 
2. The General Framework 
To fully specify an egalitarian theory one must specify the type of benefits that it seeks to 
equalize. Throughout, we leave open the relevant conception of benefit (resources, primary 
goods, brute luck well-being, etc.) References to a person being worse off than another should be 
understood in terms of the relevant benefits. 
 We shall assume, for the sake of argument, that benefits are fully measurable and 
interpersonally comparable. This may seem like a strong assumption, but in the present context it 
is a very weak assumption. The assumption that benefits are so measurable and comparable does 
not entail that such information is relevant for the moral assessment of options. The assumption 
is simply that such information is available. This ensures that no principle of justice is ruled out 
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merely on the grounds that it presupposes that benefits are measurable or comparable in ways 
that they are not. One important qualification, however, is needed here: if benefits are not—as 
required by leximin—ordinally interpersonally comparable (i.e., if there are no facts about who 
is worse off than whom), then leximin is not possible. Because we are exploring the possibility 
of avoiding leximin (or something like it) where it is possible, the assumption that benefits are at 
least so measurable and comparable is essential to our results. 
We shall be concerned with the assessment of the justice of alternatives, where 
alternatives are possible objects of choice (e.g., actions or social policies). Alternatives may have 
all kinds of features: they generate a certain distribution of benefits, satisfy or violate various 
rights, involve various intentions, and so on. In what follows, we shall assume that the only 
relevant information for the assessment of justice is the benefit distribution that an alternative 
generates. More formally, we shall assume: 
 
Benefitism: Alternatives can be identified with (and thus their justice assessed solely on the 
basis of) their benefit distributions. 
 
Benefitism is a generalization of welfarism. Although it does not assume that welfare is 
all that matters, it does assume that justice supervenes on individual benefits. If two alternatives 
generate the same distribution of benefits, then they have the same status with respect to justice. 
Benefitism is a very strong assumption. It rules out the relevance, for example, of 
respecting the wills of agents (e.g., as reflected in their consent). It holds that there is no 
difference with respect to justice between forcing a person to go jogging against her will and 
merely successfully encouraging her to do so, if the benefits to her and everyone else are the 
same. Although we would reject this condition for this reason, we shall here grant it, since it is 
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not relevant for the issue at hand. The issue of whether something like leximin is the only 
plausible egalitarian theory of justice arises even if equality promotion is limited, for example, to 
those alternatives that respect the wills of agents (e.g., violate no rights). Granting Benefitism 
will simplify the presentation. The results could, however, be recast as applying where the only 
relevant differences between alternatives concerns the distributions of benefit that they generate. 
Given Benefitism, we can identify an alternative with the benefit distribution that it 
generates, and in what follows we shall do so for simplicity. We shall further assume that the set 
of benefit distributions generated by the set of possible alternatives is rich in the following sense: 
 
Domain Richness:  For any logically possible benefit distribution there is an alternative that 
generates that distribution. 
 
 This condition rules out, for example, the possibility that, where there are just three 
people, the distribution <3,7,9> (3 to the first person, 7 to the second, 9 to the third) is not one of 
the alternatives. All logically possible benefit distributions are among the alternatives. This is not 
to say that all are part of any given feasible set (the alternatives that are open to an agent on a 
given occasion). Of course, there are lots of logically possible benefit distributions that are not 
feasible on a given occasion. The claim here is about the range of benefit distributions that can 
be assessed by justice, equality, or other normatively relevant perspectives. The condition holds 
that such judgements can be made for all logically possible distributions. 
 We believe that this is a highly plausible condition. Benefit distributions here play the 
role of test cases for a theory of justice. All logically possible test cases—assuming, as we shall, 
a finite population—are admissible.  
 Justice can be understood in axiological terms—what is at least as just as what—or in 
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deontic terms—what is just (permitted by justice) relative to a set of feasible alternatives. 
Deontic justice in this sense need not be grounded in deontological properties. It might be, for 
example, that an option is deontically just if and only if it maximizes total wellbeing. We shall 
start by considering axiological justice and then turn to deontic justice.  
Axiological justice is concerned with the justice relation of (one alternative) being-at-
least-as-just-as (another). Following the standard definitions, (1) an alternative is more just than 
another if and only if it is at least as just and the other is not at least as just as it; and (2) an 
alternative is equally as just as another if and only if it is at least as just and that other is also at 
least as just as it. 
    
3. Paretian Egalitarianism 
Our general question is: What kinds of egalitarianism are compatible with the view that 
increasing everyone’s benefits makes things more just? Pure egalitarianism holds that justice is 
concerned only with the equality of the distribution of benefits. Justice is sometimes understood 
as the purely comparative concern for ensuring that people get what they are owed, and, so 
understood, pure egalitarianism applied to brute luck benefits (benefits that were not deliberately 
produced by anyone) is not an implausible view. From a purely comparative perspective, it is 
worse when some get more brute luck benefits than others. Here, however, we are concerned 
with justice understood as the concern for people getting what they are owed in a non-purely 
comparative manner, and part of what individuals are so owed, we shall assume, is that their 
benefits be as high as possible, given the benefits that others receive. As a theory of justice so 
understood, pure egalitarianism is implausible, because it holds, for example, that perfect 
equality (e.g., <5,5,5>) is more just than everyone having more benefits but with an unequal 
distribution (e.g., <6,9,12>). Pure egalitarianism fails, that is, to recognize that justice is 
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concerned in part with increasing the benefits that individuals obtain. 
 This problem with pure egalitarianism has lead many egalitarians to embrace leximin, 
which holds that justice is increased if and only if (1) the benefits to the worst off position are 
increased, or, (2) in case of ties, the benefits to the second worse off position are increased, and 
so on. Leximin adequately recognizes that justice is concerned with increasing people’s benefits, 
but it suffers from a different problem. It gives absolute priority to the worst off position. It holds 
that justice can require giving a very small benefit to the worst off position rather than giving 
large benefits to many slightly better off people who would still have less than average benefits 
(e.g., that <2,2,2,2,400> is more just than <1,80,80,80,400>).  
 Leximin is but one of a class of principles that give strict priority to benefits to the worst 
off position. In what follows, we shall be concerned with weak maximin, which is the principle 
that an alternative is more just if it makes the worst off position better off. Weak maximin is 
silent about cases where the worst off position is equally well off (e.g., <2,3,5> vs. <2,4,4>), and 
is compatible with various ways of handling such cases. In what follows we shall examine the 
possibility of avoiding the strict priority of benefits to the worst off required by weak maximin. 
 A different—and seemingly more promising—way of combining a concern for the worse 
off with a concern for increasing people’s benefits is (axiological) Paretian Egalitarianism, 
which is the conjunction of Strong Pareto and Weak Egalitarianism, as defined below.  
 
Strong Pareto: For any two alternatives x and y, if each person has at least as much benefits in x 
as in y, then (1) x is as least as just as y, and (2) if there is at least one person that has more 
benefits in x than in y, then x is more just than y. 
 
 This is a weak efficiency condition on the promotion of benefits (much weaker than the 
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utilitarian sum-total conception of efficiency). It requires, for example, that <2,4,6> be judged 
more just than <1,4,6> and also more just than <2,3,6>. It is silent about whether <2,4,6> is more 
just than <99,1,6>. 
 For the next condition, we appeal to the equality of distributions (which we will discuss 
in detail in the next section) and need to introduce the following definition. Call a distribution 
anonymously Pareto incomparable to another just in case it, and each of its benefit permutations 
(i.e., the same distribution of benefits except perhaps with people occupying different positions 
in the distribution), is Pareto incomparable (i.e., better for some and worse for some others) to 
the other distribution. This is a strong kind of Pareto incomparability. For example, <1,3,6> is 
Pareto incomparable with <2,1,6> but it is not anonymously Pareto incomparable, since <1,2,6> 
is a permutation of the latter and it is Pareto inferior to <1,3,6>. 
 Consider now the following condition: 
 
Weak Egalitarianism: For any two alternatives that are anonymously Pareto incomparable, (1) 
if their two benefit distributions are equally equal, then they are equally just, and (2) if the 
benefit distribution of one is more equal than that of the other, then the former is more just. 
 
 This is a very weak egalitarian condition. It does not require (as pure egalitarianism does) 
that equality be the only concern of justice. It only holds that equality is determinative of justice 
in the case where two alternatives are anonymously Pareto incomparable. It is a very weak 
egalitarian principle, because it is silent even in many cases of Pareto incomparability (viz., those 
that are not anonymously Pareto incomparable).  
Weak Egalitarianism could be rejected for several possible reasons. One is the denial that 
equality is ever relevant to justice. A second reason allows that equality is relevant but only as a 
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pro tanto consideration that can be outweighed by other considerations (e.g., sufficient increases 
in total benefits). A third reason holds that equality is indeed determinative of justice under 
certain conditions, but these conditions are limited to cases where the total is the same. Equality, 
on this view, is simply a tie-breaker when the totals are the same. 
 We believe that equality is more central to justice than these objections allow. In any 
case, in this paper we want to explore whether weak maximin is forced on a certain kind of weak 
egalitarianism, and hence we shall accept this condition. The conjunction of Strong Pareto and 
Weak Egalitarianism defines Paretian Egalitarianism. There are different forms of Paretian 
Egalitarianism, because the conjunction of these two conditions leaves open how distributions 
are ranked that are Pareto incomparable but not anonymously Pareto incomparable (e.g.,  
<8,10,12> vs. <9,8,12>). Different forms of Paretian Egalitarianism fill in these cases in different 
ways.  
 One version of Paretian Egalitarianism that we shall consider below is Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism, which is defined as the conjunction of Strong Pareto and the following stronger 
equality condition: 
 
Moderate Egalitarianism: For any two alternatives that are Pareto incomparable, (1) if their 
two benefit distributions are equally equal, then they are equally just, and (2) if the benefit 
distribution of one is more equal than that of the other, then the former is more just. 
 
 This is just like Weak Egalitarianism except that it makes equality determinative of 
justice whenever two alternatives are Pareto incomparable, and not merely when they are 
anonymously Pareto incomparable. For example, if <9,8,8> is more equal than <8,10,12>, then it 
says that it is also more just, whereas Weak Egalitarianism is silent (since they are not 
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anonymously Pareto incomparable). Moderate egalitarianism gives equality the strongest role 
possible while respecting Strong Pareto. It entails Weak Egalitarianism, but not vice versa. 
Paretian Egalitarianism seems like a promising way of combining equality with the 
efficient promotion of benefits while avoiding weak maximin’s obsession with the worst off 
individual. Paretian Egalitarians, for example, may wish to hold that <2,10,100> is less equal 
than <1,100,100>—and hence less just (given that they are anonymously Pareto incomparable). 
We shall now see, however, that if certain seemingly intuitively plausible assumptions are 
satisfied, then Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible, and Paretian Egalitarianism 
cannot disagree with weak maximin. It cannot, for example, hold that <2,10,100> is less just—or 
even less equal—than <1,100,100>. Thus, Paretian Egalitarianism appears not to be a real 
alternative to weak maximin.1 
 
4. The Equality Relation 
Paretian egalitarianism appeals to the equality relation of one distribution of benefits being at 
least as equal as that of another. Following the standard definitions, (1) an alternative is more 
equal than another if and only if it is at least as equal and the other is not at least as equal as it; 
and (2) an alternative is equally as equal as another if and only if it is at least as equal and that 
other is also at least as equal as it. We here identify some uncontroversial assumptions that we 
make about this relation.  
 Our framework assumption of Domain Richness is an assumption about the range of 
benefit distributions that can be assessed by justice, equality, or other normatively relevant 
perspectives, and thus applies for the equality relation. It thus entails that the domain of the 
equality relation is the set of all logically possible distributions of benefits. We do not assume 
that the equality relation is complete, nor, except for one result at the end, that it satisfies any 
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consistency requirement (such as acyclicity).  
  We shall, however, make the following three assumptions about this relation, each of 
which is at least close to being a conceptual truth about equality. 
 Consider, first: 
 
Perfect Equality: A distribution in which everyone gets the same benefits is more equal than 
one in which this is not so. 
 
 This is completely uncontroversial. It says, for example, that <3,3,3> is more equal than 
<2,3,4> and more equal than <5,6,6>. 
 
 A second condition is: 
 
Equality Strong Anonymity: For any two alternatives, x and y, if x is at least as equal as y, 
then, for any alternative, x*, for which the benefit distribution is a permutation of the benefit 
distribution of x (i.e., has the same pattern of benefits, but perhaps with individuals receiving 
different allocations), x* is at least as equal as y. 
 
 This is a limited anonymity requirement on equality. It requires that, if <2,5,13> is more 
equal than <2,9,12>, then so is <5,2,13>. Equality Strong Anonymity is highly plausible, since 
equality is based solely on the pattern of benefits and is not concerned with who gets what. 
 A third plausible condition is: 
 
Strong Contracting Extremes Equality: If (1a) the benefits of all the best off individuals are 
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reduced without making them cease to the best off, and/or (1b) the benefits of all the worst off 
individuals are increased without making them cease to be the worst off, and (2) no one else is 
affected, then the result is more equal than the original distribution.2 
 
 This condition is also extremely plausible. It holds, for example, that <2,2,5,6,8,8> is 
more equal than each of <1,1,5,6,9,9>, <2,2,5,6,9,9>, and <1,1,5,6,8,8>. 
 We are almost ready to begin examining the possibility of Paretian Egalitarianism 
disagreeing with weak maximin. First, however, it will be useful to note that, where there are 
only two people, weak maximin and the equality relation are intimately related. 
  
Result 1: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the equality relation 
satisfies Equality Strong Anonymity and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, and (3) 
there are only two people, then for any two anonymously Pareto incomparable 
alternatives, the alternative that makes the worst off position better off is more equal. 
 
 The proof is as follows: Consider any two anonymously Pareto incomparable 
alternatives. Because there are only two persons and they are anonymously Pareto incomparable, 
if the worst off position in one alternative, x, receives more benefits then the worst off position in 
the other alternative, y, then the best off position in x receives fewer benefits than the best off 
position in y. If the worst off person is the same in both alternatives (e.g., x=<6,8> and 
y=<5,100>), then it follows directly from Strong Contracting Extremes Equality that x is more 
equal than y. If the worst off person is not the same in both alternatives (e.g., x=<6,8> and 
y=<100,5>), then by Domain Richness, we may consider a permutation of x, x* (x*= <8,6>), 
and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality will judge x* more equal than y. Hence, by Equal 
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Strong Anonymity, x is more equal than y. 
 In the two person case, then, equality always favors the worst off when alternatives are 
anonymously Pareto incomparable. This ensures that, in the two person case, Weak 
Egalitarianism never conflicts with weak maximin. If two alternatives are not anonymously 
Pareto incomparable, then Weak Egalitarianism is silent and no conflict is possible. If the two 
alternatives are anonymously Pareto comparable, then equality agrees with weak maximin. 
This need not be the case, however, when there are more than two persons. The conjunction of 
Strong Contracting Extremes and Equality Strong Anonymity are silent, for example, about 
whether <6,8,100> is more equal than <100,5,100>. Nonetheless, as we shall now show, if 
certain additional assumptions are made, then Paretian Egalitarianism must hold that <6,8,100> 
is more just—and indeed, more equal—than <100,5,100>. More generally, even in the multi-
person case, Paretian Egalitarianism, like weak maximin, must not judge an alternative as at least 
as just as another if it is worse for the worst off position. 
 
5. Axiological Justice 
Axiological justice is concerned with the justice relation, and hence we need to specify the 
structure of this relation. We shall assume that the justice relation satisfies the following 
consistency condition: 
 
Acyclicity: If, for alternatives x1,….xn, x1 is more just than x2, x2 is more just than x3, …. and xn-
1 is more just than xn, then xn is not more just than x1.   
 
Acyclicity is much weaker than the better known requirement of transitivity. It applies only to 
chains of where each alternative is more just than its successor (as opposed to being at least as 
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just) and allows the possibilities of silence (no ranking) and of holding the first alternative be 
judged equally just as the last (whereas transitivity requires that it be judged more just). It is 
about as close to being uncontroversial as one can get when it comes to consistency requirements 
on the justice relation. 
 For some of the results, we will strengthen this condition slightly in two ways. One is to 
invoke: 
 
Strong Acyclicity: If, for alternatives x1,….xn, x1 is at least as just as x2, x2 is at least as just as 
x3, …. and xn-1 is at least as just as xn, then (1) xn is not more just than x1, and (2) if for some i 
inclusively between 1 and n-1, xi is more just than xi+1, then xn is not at least as just as x1. 
 
This strengthens Acyclicity by covering chains where each alternative is at least as just (as 
opposed to more just) as its successor. If each of the pairs are equally just, then it concludes that 
the last alternative is not more just than the first (as opposed to the silence of Acyclicity). 
Moreover, if all the relations in this chain are the relations of being more just, then Strong 
Acyclicity strengthens Acyclicity by requiring that the last alternative not be at least as just as 
the first (as opposed to Acyclicity’s requirement that it not be more just). Like Acyclicity, Strong 
Acyclicity is accepted by almost everyone. 
 We will also consider the implications of the following strengthening of Acyclicity:  
 
Quasi-Transitivity: If, for alternatives x1, x2, and x3, x1 is more just than x2, x2 is more just than 
x3, then x1 is more just than x3.   
 
 This is strictly stronger than Acyclicity in that it requires that the first element be more 
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just than the last (as opposed to Acyclicity’s requirement that the last is not more just than the 
first). Quasi-Transitivity is strictly weaker than transitivity, since (like Acyclicity) it says nothing 
about chains in which one or more alternatives is only ranked as at least as just as its successor 
(as opposed to more just). It is also weaker than Strong Acyclicity in this respect. It is, however, 
stronger than Strong Acyclicity in another respect: for chains of alternatives that are each more 
just than their successors, it requires that the first be more just than the last, whereas Strong 
Acyclicity allows silence.  
 Quasi-Transitivity is much more controversial than Strong Acyclicity. Indeed, one of us 
(Vallentyne) would reject it on the ground that sometimes silence is appropriate concerning the 
ranking of the first and last alternatives. Fortunately, our core results do not depend on this 
assumption. We shall merely note how they can be strengthened if one assumes Quasi-
Transitivity as opposed to Strong Acyclicity. 
 It’s important to note that we do not assume that the justice relation is complete (i.e., that 
for any two alternatives, at least one is at least as just as the other). Paretian Egalitarians, for 
example, may remain silent about the ranking of two alternatives which are Pareto incomparable 
(and hence not covered by Strong Pareto) but not anonymously so (and hence not covered by 
Weak Egalitarianism). Moreover, even in cases of anonymous Pareto incomparability, Weak 
Egalitarianism may be silent because the equality relation may be incomplete and be silent about 
which alternative is more equal. This possible incompleteness of the justice relation is 
unproblematic for our analysis. Our results only rely on statements about the justice relation and 
the equality relation in uncontroversial cases. 
 We are now ready to present our first result concerning Paretian Egalitarianism. 
Interestingly, given the weak and plausible conditions invoked, it turns out that Paretian 
Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible.3 
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Result 2: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the justice relation 
satisfies Acyclicity, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong Anonymity and 
Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, then Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. 
 
 The proof is as follows: By Domain Richness, we may consider two alternatives x and y 
such that (a) they are Pareto incomparable but not anonymously so, (b) the benefits are the same 
in every position except for the best off position, and (c) the benefits in the best off position are 
higher in x than y (e.g., x = <7,8,11> and y = <10,8,7>). (1) By Domain Richness, there is an 
alternative, y* (<7,8,10>) that is a permutation of y and such that Strong Contracting Extremes 
Equality entails that y* is more equal than x. Equality Strong Anonymity then entails that y is 
more equal than x. Hence, Weak Egalitarianism judges that y is more just than x (because they 
are Pareto incomparable and y is more equal). (2) A contradictory judgement, however, can be 
obtained as follows. By Domain Richness, there is an alternative z (e.g., <7,8,9>) such that (a) x 
is Pareto superior to z, (b) Strong Contracting Extremes Equality judges a permutation of z, z* 
(e.g., <9,8,7>), more equal than y, and (c) z and y are Pareto incomparable. Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism thus makes the following judgements: x is more just than z (by Strong Pareto), 
and z is more just than y (z is more equal than y by Equality Strong Anonymity, and thus more 
just than y by Weak Egalitarianism). By Acyclicity, we have that y is not more just than x, which 
contradicts the conclusion obtained in (1). 
 Assuming Acyclicity and the other conditions, Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is not, however, the only form of Paretian 
Egalitarianism. The following result, however, establishes that no form of Paretian 
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Egalitarianism can significantly disagree with weak maximin. 
  
Result 3 : If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) the justice relation 
satisfies Acyclicity, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect Equality, then Paretian 
Egalitarianism judges that a distribution is not less just than another if it gives greater 
benefits to the worst off position. Moreover, (a) if the justice relation also satisfies Strong 
Acyclicity, then Paretian Egalitarianism judges that a distribution is not equally or less 
just, if it gives greater benefits to the worst off position, and (b) if the justice relation also 
satisfies Quasi-Transitivity, then Paretian Egalitarianism judges that a distribution is 
more just than another if it gives greater benefits to the worst off position.4 
 
 The proof is as follows: Consider any x and y, where the worst off position in x gets more 
benefits than the worst off position in y. (1) If no one is worse off in x than in y, then it follows 
from Strong Pareto that x is more just than y, as required. (2) If someone is worse off in x than in 
y, then the two are Pareto incomparable, and we consider two cases: (a) If there is perfect 
equality in x, then it follows that x and y are anonymously Pareto incomparable (e.g., x = 
<3,3,3> and y = <2,4,10>), and that x is more equal. Weak Egalitarianism then entails that x is 
more just than y, as required. (b) If there is inequality in x (e.g., x = <3,3,5> and y = <2,4,10>, 
then by Domain Richness there exists an alternative, z (e.g., <3,3,3>) such that everyone in z 
gets the same as the worst off in x. By Strong Pareto, x is more just than z. In this case, z and y 
are anonymously Pareto incomparable and Perfect Equality entails that z is more equal than y. 
Weak Egalitarianism then judges z more just than y. We thus have that x (<3,3,5>) is more just 
than z (<3,3,3>), which is more just than y (<2,4,10>). Acyclicity then entails that x is not less 
just than y, Strong Acyclicity entails that x is not equally or less just than y, and Quasi-
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Transitivity entails that x is more just than y, as required. 
It’s worth noting that, assuming Strong Acyclicity, the above result establishes that the 
measurement of equality—and not merely justice—must not contradict weak maximin where the 
alternatives are anonymously Pareto incomparability. This is because Paretian Egalitarianism 
ranks the justice of such distributions on the basis of their equality. The result does not require 
that equality agree with weak maximin in other cases. For example, it does not require that 
increasing the benefits of the best off person (with no changes elsewhere)—which is weakly 
maximin better—make things more equal (which would be absurd). 
 It is also worth noting that the conditions of the above result are compatible. It is 
possible, that is, to satisfy all of them. Leximin, for example, satisfies all of them. Indeed, this is 
true of all of the results of this paper, and thus we shall not bother to repeat the reminder that the 
conditions invoked are jointly compatible (and satisfied by leximin). 
 Given that Acyclicity is uncontroversial, the result establishes that Paretian 
Egalitarianism cannot judge an alternative to be more just than another if it is worse for the worst 
off position. This allows, however, that it might judge the first alternative to be equally as just as 
just as the second. Given that Strong Acyclicity is also uncontroversial, the results also rule out 
this possibility. Thus, Paretian Egalitarianism cannot contradict weak maximin. It may be silent 
in certain cases where one alternative is better for the worst off than another, but it cannot affirm 
that the second is equally, or more, just than the first. This is enough, it seems, to eliminate any 
hope of Paretian Egalitarianism being significantly distinct from weak maximin. The much more 
controversial Quasi-Transitivity is not needed to establish this conclusion—although, if granted, 
it significantly strengthens the conclusion by ruling out the possibility of silence and thus 
requiring that Paretian Egalitarianism judge more just an alternative that is better for the worst 
off position. 
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 There is, however, a possibility that we have not yet explored. We have so far focused on 
the justice relation. We have, that is, focused on axiological justice (what is more just than what). 
A different approach is to formulate the conditions of justice in deontic terms, that is, in terms of 
what is just (i.e., permitted by justice) relative to set of feasible alternatives. This latter approach 
does not attempt to provide a global ranking of alternatives. Instead, it attempts simply to 
determine which of any given set of feasible alternatives are just. We shall now explore whether 
the above results remain valid in this context.5 
 
6. Deontic Justice 
To start, let us reformulate the above axiological conditions that were used to define Paretian 
Egalitarianism and the two specific versions. The following definitions will be used below. An 
alternative is Pareto optimal, relative to a given feasible set, if and only if no feasible alternative 
is Pareto superior (i.e., makes some better off and no one worse off). An alternative is 
anonymously Pareto optimal, relative to a given feasible set, if and only if no feasible alternative 
is, or has a feasible permutation that is, Pareto superior. 
 Consider, then, the following conditions: 
 
Deontic Strong Pareto: For any two alternatives x and y, if each person has at least as much 
benefits in x as in y, then, whenever both are feasible: (1) x is just, if y is, and (2) if there is at 
least one person that has more benefits in x than in y, then y is not just.  
 
Deontic Weak Egalitarianism: If two alternatives x and y are anonymously Pareto 
incomparable, then, whenever both are feasible: (1) if they are equally equal, one is just if and 
only if the other is, and (2) if x is more equal than y, then y is not just. 
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Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism: If two alternatives x and y are Pareto incomparable, then, 
whenever both are feasible: (1) if they are equally equal, one is just if and only if the other is, and 
(2) if x is more equal than y, then y is not just. 
 
 Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism is the conjunction of Deontic Strong Pareto and Deontic 
Weak Egalitarianism. The conjunction of Deontic Strong Pareto and Deontic Moderate 
Egalitarianism defines Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism. We shall starting by showing 
that, as in the axiological case, this latter theory of justice is impossible if one also accepts the 
following condition: 
 
No Prohibition Dilemmas:  For any feasible set of alternatives, at least one feasible alternative 
is just. 
 
 This condition is plausible from the perspective of practical justice, according to which 
justice is purely a matter of comparing favorably in the relevant respects with the feasible 
alternatives (e.g., being at least as good in the relevant respect as all (or 90%) of the feasible 
alternatives [which is always possible], as opposed to giving everyone an adequate level of 
benefits [which is not always possible]). Practical justice always satisfies No Prohibition 
Dilemmas. Of course, justice can be understood in a more ideal way that does not guarantee that 
at least one feasible alternative is just, but we here focus on practical justice.6 
 Before introducing our first deontic result, let us note that we are assuming (as is 
standard) that, with one qualification, any logically possible set of alternatives is a possible 
feasible set. The qualification is that we restrict feasible sets to those for which, for each 
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individual, there is a maximum possible benefit. The qualification is needed because it is unclear 
what rationality and justice require when benefits can be increased without limit. Let us now 
note:  
 
Result 4: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies No 
Prohibition Dilemmas, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong Anonymity 
and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, then Deontic Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism is impossible. 
 
 
 The proof is straightforward and we will illustrate it with a three person example: By 
Domain Richness, we may consider the following feasible set {<11,9,8>, <10,9,8>, <9,10,8>}. 
Here, <10,9,8> is more equal than <11,9,8> by Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, and hence 
Equality Strong Anonymity entails that <9,10,8> is also more equal. Moreover, Equal Strong 
Anonymity entails that <9,10,8> and <10,9,8> are equally equal. Deontic Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism thus makes the following judgements: (1) by Deontic Weak Egalitarianism, 
<11,9,8> is unjust because it and <9,10,8> are Pareto incomparable and the latter is more equal, 
(2) by Deontic Strong Pareto, <10,9,8> is unjust because it is not Pareto optimal, and (3) by 
Deontic Weak Egalitarianism, <9,10,8> is unjust because <10,9,8> is unjust and they are equally 
equal. Thus, nothing is just, which violates No Prohibition Dilemmas. 
 Given the conditions of the result, Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. The core idea of the proof is this: Deontic Strong Pareto requires that non-Pareto 
optimal feasible alternatives be judged unjust, and Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism requires that 
feasible alternatives that are less equal than some anonymously Pareto incomparable feasible 
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alternative be judged unjust. Sometimes, all Pareto optimal alternatives are less equal than some 
anonymously incomparable feasible alternative, and thus nothing is judged just, which violates 
No Prohibition Dilemmas. It’s important to note that this result does not depend on any condition 
that is a deontic counterpart to Acyclicity (or Strong Acyclicity or Quasi-Transitivity).  
 Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible. It is not, however, the only form 
of Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism. Indeed, there are versions of Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism 
that, for some feasible sets, disagree with weak maximin. This, however, is not a particularly 
interesting observation, because, as we shall now show, if a feasibility set is rich in a certain 
sense, then the possibility of disagreement disappears. 
Domain Richness guarantees that the set of all alternatives includes all logically possible 
distributions of benefits. This does not, however, guarantee that any particular feasibility set is 
rich in any interesting sense. We shall focus, therefore, on feasibility sets that are minimally rich 
in the sense that if alternative x is feasible and maximizes (relative to the feasibility set) the 
benefits to the worst off position, then so is an alternative that gives everyone those same 
benefits. Thus, the feasible set {<2,4,6> , <1,9,9>}, is not minimally rich because it does not 
contain <2,2,2>, whereas {<2,4,6> , <1,9,9>, <2,2,2>} is minimally rich. Most intuitively 
“normal” feasible sets are minimally rich, since it is usually feasible, to discard some of the 
benefits and level everyone down to the lowest level. In any case, we have the following result 
for feasible sets that are minimally rich: 
 
Result 5: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies 
No Prohibition Dilemmas, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect Equality, then, 
for any minimally rich set, Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism (a) judges just some 
alternative that maximizes the benefits of the worst off position and (b) judges unjust all 
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alternatives that do not maximize the benefits to the worst off position. 
 
 The proof is as follows: Consider any minimally rich feasible set, and let x be any 
feasible alternative that does not maximize the benefits to the worst off position and let y be any 
feasible alternative that does maximize the benefits to the worst off position. We will now show 
that Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism has to judge x as unjust in this situation and that it must 
judge just some alternative that maximizes the benefits to the worst off position. (1) If no else 
gets more benefits in x than in y (e.g., x = <2,4,6> and y = <3,4,6>), then Deontic Strong Pareto 
entails that x is unjust, as required. (2) If someone else gets more benefits in x than in y (e.g., x = 
<2,4,6> and y = <3,3,6>), then it follows that there is inequality in x. In this case, given that the 
feasible set is minimally rich, there exists an alternative, z (e.g., <3,3,3>), such that everyone in z 
gets the same benefits as the worst off position in y. Given that (a) alternative z is anonymously 
Pareto incomparable with x (since the benefits of the worst off position are higher in z than x, 
and the benefits of the best off position are lower in z than in x), and (b) Perfect Equality entails 
that z is more equal than x, Deontic Weak Egalitarianism entails that x is not just relative to this 
feasible set, as required. Given that x was an arbitrary feasible alternative that does not maximize 
the benefits to the worst off position, it follows that no such alternative is just. (3) By No 
Prohibition Dilemma, it follows immediately that some feasible alternative that does maximize 
the benefits to the worst off position is just, as required.  
 Thus, although Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism can disagree with weak maximin, it 
cannot do so for feasibility sets that are minimally rich. Given that minimal richness is a 
condition that is typically satisfied in real life situations, this possibility of disagreement is not 
very significant. For most practical applications, Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism cannot 
contradict weak maximin. 
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 It’s worth emphasizing that this result does not depend on any assumption of Acyclicity 
or any similar deontic consistency condition. Below we shall establish some results that do so 
depend. 
 
7. Deontic Justice Reconsidered 
The results of the previous section establish that merely moving to a deontic framework is not 
enough to avoid the core of the two axiological results. One might argue, however, that the 
above formulations of the deontic egalitarian conditions are excessively strong. To see this, 
consider: 
 
Restricted Deontic Weak Egalitarianism: If, for a given feasible set, two alternatives x and y 
are anonymously Pareto optimal, then (1) if they are equally equal, one is just if and only if the 
other is, and (2) if x is more equal than y, then y is not just. 
 
Restricted Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism: If, for a given feasible set, two alternatives x 
and y are Pareto optimal, then (1) if they are equally equal, one is just if and only if the other is, 
and (2) if x is more equal than y, then y is not just. 
 
 These conditions are like their unrestricted counterparts, except that they apply, for a 
given feasible set, only to Pareto optimal alternatives (and, in the case of Restricted Deontic 
Weak Egalitarianism, only to those that are anonymously Pareto optimal)—rather than to all 
feasible alternatives. Suppose, for example, that the feasibility set is {<2,5>, <5,3>, <4,3>}. 
Deontic Weak Egalitarianism says that <2,5> is not just because it is anonymously Pareto 
incomparable to, and (by Equality Strong Anonymity) less equal than, <4,3>. Restricted Deontic 
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Weak Egalitarianism, however, does not say this. It applies only to anonymously Pareto optimal 
options. Given that <4,3> is not anonymously Pareto optimal, the fact that it is more equal than 
<2,5> is not deemed relevant. 
 Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism is the conjunction of Deontic Strong Pareto 
and Restricted Deontic Weak Egalitarianism, and Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism is the conjunction of Deontic Strong Pareto and Restricted Deontic Moderate 
Egalitarianism.7 Unlike the axiological and the unrestricted deontic case, in this restricted deontic 
case, Paretian moderate egalitarianism is, it seems, possible, as long as we assume that the 
equality relation satisfies the following condition:  
 
Equality Acyclicity: If, for alternatives x1,….xn, x1 is more equal than x2, x2 is more equal than 
x3, …. and xn-1 is equal just than xn, then xn is not more equal than x1.   
 
We have been assuming that the justice relation is acyclic, but so far we have not needed to 
assume that the equality relation is. Without this assumption, every Pareto optimal alternative 
could be less equal than some other Pareto optimal alternative, and Restricted Deontic Paretian 
Moderate Egalitarianism would judge all feasible alternatives unjust, which would violate No 
Prohibition Dilemmas. The assumption of acyclicity, however, is entirely uncontroversial, and 
we are merely explicitly noting it. 
 Consider then: 
 
Result 6:  Given (1) Benefitism and Domain Richness and (2) that the equality relation 
satisfies Equality Acyclicity, Perfect Equality, Equality Strong Anonymity, Strong 
Contracting Extremes Equality, there are versions of Deontic Paretian Moderate 
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Egalitarianism (and hence Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism in general) that satisfy No 
Prohibition Dilemmas and that, even for a minimally rich feasible set, (a) judge a feasible 
alternative just even though it does not maximize the benefits to the worst off position, 
and (b) judge a feasible alternative unjust even though it does maximize the benefits to 
the worst off position. 
 
To see this, consider the following version: 
  
Full Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism: An alternative is just, relative to a 
feasible set, if and only if it is Pareto optimal and no Pareto optimal alternative is more equal.8 
 
 This theory judges all alternatives just except those that are not Pareto optimal and those 
that are less equal than some Pareto optimal alternative. Hence, it satisfies both Deontic Strong 
Pareto and Restricted Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism. Moreover, for any acyclic equality 
relation, it will also satisfy No Prohibition Dilemmas (since there will always be at least one 
Pareto optimal alternative that is not less equal than some other one). Hence, in order to see that 
this theory of justice constitutes a real alternative to weak maximin, we may simply consider an 
equality relation satisfying our minimal conditions that disagrees with weak maximin. By way of 
illustration, suppose that a distribution is more equal if the total shortfall from the mean is less. 
This equality relation is acyclic and satisfies our three conditions on equality (proof omitted). 
Now consider the feasible set {<2,2,2>, <2,3,43>, <1,40,46>}, which is minimally rich. 
Alternatives  <2,3,43> and <1,40,46> are the only two Pareto optimal alternatives, and <2,3,43> 
(mean of 16, total shortfall of 27) is less equal than <1,40,46> (mean of 29, total shortfall of 28). 
Hence, given this equality relation, Full Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism 
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judges <1,40,46> as just (because it is a most equal Pareto optimal alternative), judges <2,3,43> 
as unjust (because it is less equal than some other Pareto optimal alternative than), and judges 
<2,2,2> as unjust (because it is not Pareto optimal). Thus, Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate 
Egalitarianism can judge unjust an alternative that maximizes the benefits to the worst off 
position, and it can judge just an alternative that does not maximize these benefits. 
 Finally, then, we have, it seems, the possibility of a form of Paretian egalitarianism that 
can disagree with weak maximin even in the case of minimal rich feasible sets. There may, 
however, be further plausible conditions that, if imposed, would rule out this apparent 
possibility. Before concluding, we shall consider one such candidate condition . 
As noted above, we have not assumed any consistency conditions that correspond to 
Acyclicity (or other conditions related to transitivity). In a deontic context, however, the 
following condition is widely accepted: 
 
Alpha (contraction consistency): If an alternative is judged just relative to a given feasible set, 
then it is also judged just from any subset containing it. 
   
Alpha is concerned with the preservation of judgement of justness as a feasibility set is 
contracted while still containing the alternative originally judged just. It is violated, for example, 
if x is judged just relative to {x,y,z}, but not judged just relative to {x,y}. If it is a winner against 
x and y, why wouldn’t it also be a winner against y alone? 
 If we accept Alpha, the impossibility of Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism returns: 
 
Result 7: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies No 
Prohibition Dilemmas and Alpha, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Equality Strong 
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Anonymity and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, then Restricted Deontic Paretian 
Moderate Egalitarianism is impossible.9 
 
 The proof is as follows. (1) By Domain Richness, we may consider the feasible set 
consisting of <6,9,12>, <11,9, 6> and <100,9,6>. Here <6,9,12> and <100,9,6> are Pareto 
optimal, but <11,9,6> is not. (a) By Deontic Strong Pareto, <11,9,6> is not just. (b) By Equality 
Strong Anonymity and Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, <6,9,12> is more equal than 
<100,9,6>.  Restricted Deontic Moderate Egalitarianism thus judges <100,9,6> not just. (c) By 
No Prohibition Dilemmas, <6,9,12> is thus just. (2) Consider now the feasible set consisting of 
just <6,9,12> and  <11,9,6>, a subset of the original set. (a) By Equality Strong Anonymity and 
Strong Contracting Extremes Equality, <6,9,12> is less equal than <11,9,6>. Restricted Deontic 
Moderate Egalitarianism, thus judges <6,9,12> not just. (3) Given that <6,9,12> was judged just 
from the first set (in 1c), but not from this proper subset, Alpha is violated. 
 If we impose Alpha, then Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism is 
impossible. It is not, however, the only form of Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism and 
some of these other forms are possible. As in the previous cases we have considered, however, 
no form can disagree with weak maximin when applied to minimally rich sets. 
 
Result 8: If (1) we have Benefitism and Domain Richness, (2) deontic justice satisfies 
No Prohibition Dilemmas and Alpha, and (3) the equality relation satisfies Perfect 
Equality, then, for any feasible set, Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism must (a) 
judge just some alternative that maximizes the benefits to the worst off position, and (b), 
if the feasible set is minimally rich, judge unjust any alternative that does not maximize 
the benefits to the worst off position,. 
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 The proof is as follows: Consider any feasible set for which some but not all alternatives 
maximize the benefits to the worst off position. Let y and x be arbitrary alternatives in this set 
that respectively maximize, and do not maximize, the benefits to the worst off position. We will 
first show that, if the feasible set is minimally rich, Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism 
has to judge x as unjust and has to judge just some alternative that maximizes the benefits of the 
worst off position. Following that, we show that it must make the second judgement even if the 
feasible set is not minimally rich. (1) Suppose, then, that the feasible set is minimally rich. (a) If 
no else gets more benefits in x than in y (e.g., x = <2,4,6> and y = <3,4,6>), then Deontic Strong 
Pareto entails that x is unjust. Given that x was an arbitrary alternative that does not maximize 
the benefits to the worst off position, No Prohibition Dilemmas then implies that some 
alternative that does maximize the benefits to worst off position is just. (b) If someone else gets 
more benefits in x than in y (e.g., x = <2,4,6> and y = <3,3,6>), then it follows that there is 
inequality in x. In this case, given that the feasible set is minimally rich, there exists an 
alternative, z (e.g., <3,3,3>), such that everyone in z gets the same benefits as the worst off 
position in y. Consider now the feasible set obtained from the original by removing all the 
alternatives other than z that maximize the benefits to the worst off position. In this restricted set, 
z is anonymously Pareto optimal and, by Perfect Equality, more equal than any other 
anonymously Pareto optimal alternative. Hence, by Restricted Deontic Weak Egalitarianism, x 
and all other alternatives except for z are unjust, and by No Prohibition Dilemmas z is just. By 
Alpha, x is also unjust in the original superset. Given that x was an arbitrary alternative that did 
not maximize the benefits to the worst off position, this shows that every alternative that fails to 
so maximize is unjust in the original set. No Prohibition Dilemmas then entails that some 
alternative that does maximize the benefits to the worst off position is just, as required. (2) 
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Suppose now that the original set is not minimally rich. We may make this set minimally rich by 
adding an alternative that gives everyone the same benefits as the worst off position in an 
alternative that maximizes the benefits of the worst off. From (1), we know that for a minimally 
rich feasible set, there is an alternative, y, that maximizes the benefits of the worst off position, 
and is judged just, relative to this extended set. By Alpha, it follows that y is also just in the 
initial not minimally rich set, as required. 
 Do these results show that even Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism must agree 
with weak maximin? That, of course, depends on the plausibility of Alpha. One of us 
(Vallentyne) is firmly inclined to reject it. We shall end with a discussion of the strengths and 
weaknesses of this condition. 
 If axiological justice is a complete ordering, and, for any given feasible set, the set of just 
alternatives is simply the set of best feasible alternatives, then Alpha will be satisfied. Alpha is 
clearly a desirable condition for justice in the sense that it would be nice if justice satisfied it. 
The question, however, is whether it is a mandatory condition—one that any minimally adequate 
conception of justice must satisfy. 
 Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism can violate Alpha because it 
requires that just options be no less good in some dimension (equality) than any alternative that 
is Pareto optimal. Removing an option can make an originally Pareto suboptimal option become 
Pareto optimal, and this option may be better (more equal) than some third option that was 
originally not less good than any Pareto optimal option. Thus, this third option may be just 
relative to the original set but not relative to the subset. Suppose for the sake of argument that 
<2,2,2> is more equal than <1,40,46>, and that the latter is more equal than <2,3,43>. In this 
case, Restricted Deontic Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism judges just <1,40,46> when the 
feasible alternatives are <2,2,2> and <2,3,43> (since it is Pareto optimal and more equal than 
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<2,3,43> and <2,2,2> is not Pareto optimal), but it judges <1,40,46> unjust when the only 
feasible alternative is <2,2,2> (since the former is less equal and both are Pareto optimal). Why 
would this be incompatible with minimum adequacy in a theory of justice? It can’t be simply 
because there are two distinct dimensions of value. Justice can surely be pluralistic. Nor can it be 
the lexical priority given to one dimension (Pareto optimality). Minimally adequate theories of 
justice can surely invoke lexical priority. Nor, it seems, can it be that the lexically prior 
dimension has the feature that removing an option can make admissible a previously 
inadmissible option in this dimension. Thus, it’s unclear why Alpha would be a mandatory 
condition on justice. 
 Several authors have argued against Alpha (or its counterparts formulated in terms of 
rationality and the like rather than justice). Amartya Sen (1993), for example, has argued against 
any kind a priori requirement of internal consistency, and against Alpha in particular, for rational 
or social choice. There is nothing irrational, he argues, about having the goal of choosing the 
second largest piece of cake (e.g., so as not to appear greedy). This violates Alpha, however, 
since the originally second largest piece will not be rationally chosen if the largest piece is 
removed as a possible choice. Likewise, Sen argues, there is nothing irrational about choosing to 
fast when one has the alternatives of a full meal and of a very limited meal, but not choosing to 
fast when one’s only alternative is the very limited meal. The symbolic significance of fasting is 
radically altered by the absence of the possibility of full meal.10  
 Moreover, there are many examples of conceptions of justice that violate Alpha, but are 
not wildly implausible. To start, suppose that an option is judged just, relative to a feasible set, if 
and only if it is in the top 10% of the feasible alternatives in terms of some complete order of the 
value of alternatives. This is a kind of satisficing theory. Consider an alternative that is barely in 
the top 10% and then remove many of the less valuable options. If enough are removed, the 
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original alternative will cease to be in the top 10%, and thus cease to be just. This violation of 
Alpha does not, however, seem wildly implausible. It is not clearly inappropriate for justice to 
take into account the values of other feasible alternatives and to judge just those that are near the 
top in relative terms. 
 Consider next the view of justice that requires that “relative benefit” be leximinned, 
where relative benefit for a given individual is the ratio of the benefit the individual receives to 
the maximum feasible benefit she could receive.11 Consider the feasible set {<3,1>, <2,4>, 
<10,0>}. The relative benefits of these three alternatives are respectively {< .33,.25>, <.2,1>, 
<1,0>}, and thus <3,1> alone is deemed just (since .25 is greater than .2 and 0). If <10,0> is 
removed, however, the relative benefits are respectively {<1,.25>, <.66,1>}, and thus <2,4> 
alone is judged just (since .66 is greater than .25). This violation of Alpha, however, does not 
seem wildly implausible. Moreover, it occurs even if the requirement to leximin relative benefits 
is replaced with the requirement to maxmize the total relative benefits or the requirement to 
maximize some kind of prioritarian weighted total relative benefit. It is not clearly inappropriate 
to scale benefits relative the most an individual could get in a situation. 
 Consider finally the view of justice that requires leximaxing complaints (i.e., minimizing 
the maximum complaint, and in case of ties minimizing the second (third, etc.) maximum 
complaint), where a person’s complaint is the absolute shortfall from the greatest benefits she 
could have gotten in the given choice situations. (This is the analogue of maximin regret in 
individual choice under uncertainty.) Consider the feasible set {<4,6>, <5,4>, <10,0>}. The 
individual complaints for these three alternatives are respectively {<6,0>, <5,2>, <0,6>}, and so 
<5,4> alone is just (since 5 is less than 6). If <10,0> is removed, however, the individual 
complaints are respectively {<1,0>, <0,2>}, and so <4,6> alone is judged just. Again, this 
violation of Alpha does not seem wildly implausible. Moreover, as above, this violation occurs 
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even if the requirement to leximax complaints is replaced with the requirement to minimize the 
total complaints or the requirement to minimize some kind of prioritarian weighted total 
complaint. It is not clearly inappropriate to have justice depend on complaints in these ways. 
 In sum, if an alternative is just if and only if it is a best feasible alternative, where the 
goodness of alternatives is a complete ordering, then Alpha will be satisfied. Alpha need not be 
satisfied, however, if deontic justice is not rationalizable in the sense of there being some 
(context-free) ranking relation R, over alternatives such that an alternative is just if and only if it 
is an R-best feasible alternative. Although rationalizability is a nice property, there seems to be 
little reason to require it of all minimally adequate conceptions of justice. As we have illustrated 
above, deontic justice may rely on normative concepts that are not compatible with a context-
free rankling relation. 
 We therefore tentatively conclude that Restricted Deontic Paretian Egalitarianism is 
possible and can disagree with weak maximin.  
 
8. Conclusion 
To be plausible, egalitarian theories of justice cannot be pure egalitarian theories. Axiological 
versions (what is at least as just as what)  must hold that 1) Pareto improvements (making some 
individuals better off and no one worse off) make things more just and deontic versions (what is 
just relative to the set of feasible alternatives) must hold that no Pareto suboptimal alternative is 
just. Pareto efficiency, that is, is lexically prior to the demands of equality. Paretian 
egalitarianism is committed to this view, and we have explored some of the forms that it can 
take. 
 Given the various plausible conditions that we identified, we have established that 
Axiological Paretian Egalitarianism (1) is impossible—if it makes equality dominant in all cases 
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of Pareto incomparability, and (2) cannot disagree with weak maximin, if it limits the role of 
equality to cases of anonymous Pareto incomparability. It cannot, for example, hold that 
<2,10,100> is less just than <1,100,100>. Indeed, given that these two alternatives are 
anonymously Pareto incomparable (and thus ranked on the basis of equality), it cannot hold the 
former is less equal than the latter. This radically limits the admissible measures of equality 
available to Paretian Egalitarianism. Indeed, none of the standard measures of equality are 
available, since they all hold that at least sometimes a maximin worse distribution is more equal. 
(For example, above, the Gini coefficient of inequality is 0.58 for the first and 0.33 for the latter 
alternative.) Axiological Paretian Egalitarianism thus seems quite unpromising as an alternative 
to leximin and other forms of weak maximin. 
 If we turn to deontic justice, roughly these results remain valid if the egalitarian 
conditions are taken to require that an alternative be judged unjust if some feasible alternative is 
more equal. If, however, the egalitarian requirements are restricted to require only that an 
alternative be judged unjust if some Pareto optimal alternative is more equal, then Paretian 
egalitarianism can disagree with weak maximin. This is the only promising form of Paretian 
egalitarianism. Even it, however, cannot disagree with weak maximin if Alpha (contraction 
consistency) is imposed. We have suggested that Alpha is not a mandatory condition for justice, 
but admittedly our discussion is not conclusive. The future of Paretian egalitarianism depends on 
this issue and thus further investigation is needed. 
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1 We are here building upon some work of Tungodden (2001). Our conditions are cast in terms 
of Paretian egalitarianism and the equality relation rather than in terms of a general justice 
relation (as Tungodden does). Tungodden’s work builds upon that of Hammond (1976, 1979). 
2 This condition is stronger than that used by Tungodden (2001). His version of the condition 
requires that antecedent clauses (1a) and (1b) both hold. The condition was first formulated by 
Vallentyne (2000) where it takes (roughly) the stronger form that we invoke here. For brevity, 
we leave implicit the following antecedent clause: there is no natural zero for benefits (no non-
arbitrary way of drawing the line between positive and negative levels), or all benefit levels are 
positive, or all are negative. This clause is needed so as not to require, for example, that <0,10> 
is less equal than <0,1>. Some measures of equality hold that these two distributions are equally 
equal on the grounds that each person has the same proportion of the total benefits under the first 
as under the second. Although we believe that Strong Contracting Extremes Equality is plausible 
without being conditional on this antecedent clause, we do not presuppose this in what follows. 
Our proofs and examples are compatible with the weaker conditional version of the condition. 
3 It's worth noting the connection of this result with the impossibility of combining Moderate 
Egalitarianism with the Suppes-Sen condition—according to which x is more just than y if it is 
anonymously Pareto superior to y. This latter impossibility is straightforward, given that 
Moderate Egalitarianism requires that x be less just than y, whenever (1) x is anonymously 
Pareto superior to y but not Pareto superior, and (2) x is less equal than y (e.g., x = <2,10> and y 
= <9,2>). Although our conditions do not entail Suppes-Sen (e.g., because we do not assume that 
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the justice relation is anonymous), we do assume something close to it. Equality Strong 
Anonymity and Paretian Moderate Egalitarianism entail (assuming the reflexivity of equality) 
Justice Anonymity (a distribution and any permutation are equally just), and Justice Anonymity 
and Strong Pareto entail Suppes-Sen, if one assumes transitivity. We assume, however, only 
Acyclicity (which is not sufficient for the entailment). 
4 This is similar to a result from Tungodden (2001), but more significant. Our result with Quasi-
Transitivity is stronger in that (1) we do not impose the stronger Transitivity, (2) we impose an 
anonymity condition only on the equality relation, and not on the justice relation, and (3) we 
impose only Perfect Equality on the equality relation rather then Strong Contracting Extremes 
Equality. Moreover, we obtain related results by assuming Acyclicity or Strong Acyclicity 
instead of Quasi-Transitivity.  
5 The axiological and deontic approaches to justice have been exhaustively studied in the social 
choice literature, where they are known as the social ordering and social choice function 
approaches. See, for example, Sen (1977). 
6 It’s important to note the choice function approach of social choice theory has No Prohibition 
Dilemmas implicitly built into it. This is because the concept of a choice function—which is a 
function that, for any given feasible set, selects the subset consisting of all and only the just 
alternatives relative to that feasible set—is defined to always select a non-empty set. We here 
posit No Prohibition Dilemmas for practical justice, but for an argument that prohibition 
dilemmas are conceptually possible (e.g., not ruled out by deontic logic as such), see Vallentyne 
(1987, 1989). 
7 We have not formulated a restricted version Deontic Strong Pareto because it is equivalent to 
the unrestricted version. 
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8 Roughly this view is defended in ch. 6 of Martin (1985). 
9 Weale (1980) was perhaps the first to note the tension between Paretian egalitarianism, 
Acyclicity in the axiological case and Alpha in the deontic case. The same point was made 
independently by Williams (1995). Each wrongly concludes, however, that Paretian 
egalitarianism is incompatible with these conditions, whereas the correct conclusion is that it is 
incompatible if it measures equality in ways that disagree with weak maximin. 
10 For further discussion of Alpha, see McClennan (1990, ch. 2), Rawling (1997), and Weirich 
(1998, ch.4). McClennan notes (pp. 36-38) that the conception of rational choice developed by 
Isaac Levi for dealing with indeterminate probabilities violates Alpha. Weirich (p. 118) notes his 
conception of rational choice, which is based on a requirement of self-support (a kind of 
ratifiability) violates Alpha. 
11 This is the leximin version of maximin relative benefit that David Gauthier (1986) advocates 
as a bargaining solution. 
